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UNSETTLEDNESS IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW: BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE, CORPORATE PURPOSE*
BY LYMAN JOHNSON**
ABSTRACT
This Article revisits two fundamental issues in corporate law.
One—the central role of the business judgment rule in fiduciary
litigation—involves a great deal of seemingly settled law, while the
other—is there a mandated corporate purpose—has very little law.
Using the emergent question of whether the business judgment rule
should be used in analyzing officer and controlling shareholder fiduciary
duties, the latter issue having recently been addressed by Chancellor
Strine in the widely-heralded MFW decision, this Article proposes a
fundamental rethinking of the rule’s analytical preeminence. For a
variety of reasons, it is suggested that fiduciary duties should be made
more prominent and the business judgment rule should be dramatically
deemphasized. The policy rationales for the rule are sound, but they
have no relevance for shareholders and introduce needless complexity.
For directors, those rationales do not apply in the loyalty setting, and in
the care setting, can be achieved by recalling simply that there is no
substance to judicial review in that context.
As to corporate purpose, the Article advocates that Delaware
law permit a pluralistic approach in the for-profit corporate sector.
Long agnostic about ultimate corporate objective, Delaware law may
have turned unnecessarily toward a strict shareholder primacy focus in
the 2010 eBay decision. To bring clarification and to foster flexibility,
Professor Johnson recommends a legislative default provision, with an
opt-out feature. This feature should be in the business corporation
statute itself. Delaware’s new benefit corporation law laudably
advances the goal of institutional pluralism, but does so at the ironic risk

*
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of reinforcing a belief that business corporations themselves are legally
permitted only to maximize profits. Judges in a democratic society
should not dictate institutional goals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Apart from the Justices on the United States Supreme Court, it is
hard to imagine that any judges in our country receive closer scrutiny
than those serving on Delaware's courts. This is due to their central role,1
historically, in expounding corporate law and, more recently, in fleshing

1

Michael J. Maimone, Causes of Action, in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT GOLDEN
ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at 53, 57 (The Honorable Justice Randy J. Holland & Helen L.
Winslow eds., 2001) ("It is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court of Delaware is regarded as
the nation's leading arbiter of issues of corporate law.").
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out the law of noncorporate business entities.2 Numerous dimensions of
their business law jurisprudence have been scrupulously analyzed.3
These include, to note just a few, the longstanding "race" debate over
state and federal rivalry with Delaware4—both as to competitors' possible
influence on Delaware law and also as to the preferred forum for
chartering and for adjudicating disputes;5 the supposed substantive
superiority (or inferiority) of Delaware law as compared to other states'
laws;6 and the different philosophies underlying its noncorporate and

2
The limited liability company is rapidly emerging as the most popular business form
for new companies. Peter Walsh Jr. & Dominick T. Gattuso, Delaware LLCs - The Wave of
the Future and Advising Your Clients About What to Expect, 19 BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct.
2009, at 11; Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are The New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of
the Number of New LLCS, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 20042007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
459, 459-60 (2010) ("The limited liability company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular
form of new business entity in the United States."). Both the Delaware Supreme Court and the
Delaware Chancery Court are issuing more and more important opinions in the noncorporate
area. See, e.g., Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 2012 WL 5425227 (Del. Nov. 7,
2012).
3
See infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
4
For a fairly brief description of the origins of the "race to the bottom"/"race to the
top" debate, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race to the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95
VA. L. REV. 685, 686-87 (2009) (describing briefly the origins of the race to the bottom/race to
the top debate). Cf. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry:
Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 93-95
(2011) (explaining the "competition" debate now extends to limited liability companies).
5
See generally Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59-60 (2009) (discussing the
preeminence in corporate law and the horizontal and vertical challenges it faces). As to federal
"competition" for Delaware, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV.
588, 592 (2003). Recently, many commentators have observed that, with respect to Delaware
corporations, plaintiffs frequently are filing litigation outside Delaware. E.g., Joseph A.
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 344-45 n.57 (2012) ("[A]cademic research
suggest that Delaware has been losing cases to other venues because plaintiff counsel
perceives the Court of Chancery as an unfriendly jurisdiction.") (citing John Armour, Bernard
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law
Working Paper No. 151/2010, Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-03,
Feb. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404)). Thus,
Delaware provides the governing substantive law, but Delaware courts may not be
adjudicating these disputes. Id. This has led to proposals for ex ante resolution of this place of
filing issue via forum selection clauses in a corporation's organic documents. See Thomas T.
McClendon, Note, The Power of a Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection Clauses by
Delaware Corporations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2012).
6
See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2009) (introducing empirical evidence as to
why Delaware is the leader for corporate charters); William B. Chandler III & Anthony A.
Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carney & Shepherd's "The
Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success," 2009 U. ILL. L.J. 95, 97 (2009) (criticizing
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corporate decisions.7 And of course, there is the age-old question of
whether, in a particular case or line of cases, Delaware "got it right." Or,
as to an issue yet to be resolved, speculation as to whether they will "get
it right."
This Article takes up certain issues in Delaware corporate law
that are, as yet, unsettled. But the Article also examines some issues in
Delaware's law that, although ostensibly settled, nonetheless, to this
Author at least, remain unsettling and worth revisiting. The Article
addresses issues in Delaware's substantive corporate law itself. It does
not tackle issues about that law (or Delaware's courts) in relation to
procedural matters or to developments or institutions outside Delaware.8
The aim—in this ideal venue for exchanging ideas among the
bench, bar, and academic communities that, along with the General
Assembly, comprise the commonwealth of Delaware corporate law—is
to raise some first-order questions. Ultimately, judges must express the
resolution of fundamental issues in doctrinal terms, their lingua franca.9
Consequently, this Article will also attend to matters of legal doctrine in
Delaware law. The larger point, however, is about Delaware corporate
law as a highly adaptive and dynamic social institution, notwithstanding
the apparently settled nature of core precepts.
Delaware's leadership in corporate law is not just the result of its
well-established body of precedent, its highly regarded judiciary, or its
supposed tilt (or lack thereof, depending on one's viewpoint) toward
management or investors.10 Delaware's bench also has the advantages of
having so many opportunities to address critical corporate law issues,11
the certainty of immediate and sustained scrutiny and feedback from
lawyers and scholars, and the deft lever of equity that permits judges, as
a lawmaking mechanism, to stand between the categorical edicts of a
Carney and Shepherd's analysis about the indeterminacy of Delaware law).
7
See Lyman Johnson, Delaware's Non-waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705-08
(2011) (describing the more contractarian approach of Delaware noncorporate law as
compared to its corporate law).
8
See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. A recent example is the 2012 federal
court ruling holding unconstitutional a Delaware provision by which judges on the Chancery
Court serve as arbitrators. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del.
Aug. 30, 2012).
9
See Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua
Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups 2 (Harv. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 12-38,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117967 ("Delaware law can be expected to serve
as a 'lingua franca': firms seeking out-of-state investors will be more likely to use Delaware
law so they can provide a common language to all their investors.").
10
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
11
More than 50% of all U. S. publicly-traded companies, and 63% of the Fortune 500
are incorporated in Delaware.
Division of Corporations, ST. OF DEL.,
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited April 10, 2013).
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legislative/regulatory state and pure, unconstrained private ordering.12 To
do the latter effectively, and in a way congruent with shifting
expectations of corporate behavior in a democratic society, requires an
enormous capacity for professional introspection, engagement with the
larger corporate community, and a willingness to rethink and possibly
remold prior rulings, in the light of experience.
This Article is organized into four parts and takes up, broadly,
two issues. The first involves a subject on which, in general, there is a
great deal of law in Delaware, but not on two related and emerging subissues. The second pertains to a topic on which there is virtually no law.
In particular, Part II explores whether the cornerstone doctrine of
Delaware law—the business judgment rule—should play a central role in
adjudicating the still nascent (and unsettled) areas of officer's and
controlling shareholder's duties and liability. Those two topics also,
however, are a useful lens to raise a more general issue: Should the
business judgment rule, rather than fiduciary duties themselves, really
remain the central analytical construct in Delaware corporate law? This
Article provides several reasons why the business judgment rule should
recede in prominence in favor of emphasizing fiduciary duties. Only
Delaware's courts can settle this issue.
Part III addresses the always nettlesome issue of corporate
purpose. Specifically, does Delaware law currently—and, relatedly,
should Delaware law—mandate a particular corporate purpose? Or, is
law—and should it remain—rightly agnostic on that baseline issue?
After briefly considering certain theoretical and doctrinal failings on
corporate purpose, the Article extensively reviews the 2010 Delaware
Court of Chancery decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark
appearing to mandate profit maximization.13 It will be suggested that
eBay wrongly espouses a narrow, singular objective for corporate
endeavor that lacks authoritative support. At best, and somewhat
remarkably, existing positive law is still sufficiently unclear in 2013 that
a statutory solution, via a default purpose and optional opt-outs, is
advisable. Without a statutory "fix," or timely clarification by the
Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware law might be interpreted as
imposing an undesirable monism of corporate purpose at a time when, in

12

For a description of equity's unique constitutional status in Delaware, see Johnson,
supra note 7, at 703. For a recent example of the dynamic character of Delaware lawmaking
in the fiduciary duty area, see Lyman Johnson, Dynamic, Virtuous Fiduciary Regulation (U. of
St. Thomas [Minnesota] Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-23, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2273869.
13
16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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corporate law as elsewhere, institutional pluralism should be encouraged.
If Delaware's courts will not rectify this issue—as they can—the General
Assembly should, and it should do so within the business corporation
statute itself, not merely by enacting a new "public benefit" corporation
statute as it has recently done. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
II. RETRENCHING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule has long been the cornerstone
concept in Delaware corporate law.14 To suggest its retrenchment in a
lecture attended by many of Delaware's eminent judges and leading
members of its elite corporate bar—and in an article published in
Delaware's premier law journal—might seem an act of legal sacrilege.
Some might liken it to visiting the Vatican with the intention of giving
the Pope a copy of Luther's small catechism,15 or Calvin's Institutes of the
Christian Religion.16 It is not intended in that way, but rather in the spirit
of Holmes's famous observation that "[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV."17 Any rule of law, however old and established, must continue to
serve its intended purposes or it should be discarded, stare decisis
notwithstanding. At a minimum, it is useful from time to time to take up
settled matters, if only to reaffirm them as not having outlived their
usefulness. Moreover, the business judgment rule is well established as a
mainstay doctrine in Delaware only with respect to corporate directors,
not with respect to officers or controlling shareholders.18 This Part, after
very briefly describing what is settled about the business judgment rule,
turns to the far less settled areas of its application to officers and

14

See Rodman Ward & Paul J. Lockwood, Corporate Law, in DELAWARE SUPREME
COURT GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at 82 (The Honorable Justice Randy J. Holland &
Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001) (tracing the business judgment rule concept in Delaware back to
decisions from 1912, 1924, and 1935); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
(citing precedent); Krasnick v. Pac. E. Corp., 180 A. 604, 607 (Del. Ch. 1935); Robinson v.
Pitt. Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924); Bryan v. Aikin, 82 A. 817, 820 (Del. Ch.
1912), rev'd, 86 A. 674, 687 (Del. 1913).
15
Martin Luther, The Small Catechism of Dr. Martin Luther (Rev. H. Wetzel ed.,
trans., 1872) (1529).
16
JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (Henry Beveridge trans.,
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc. 2008) (1536).
17
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
This passage was quoted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Keeler v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co.,
672 A.2d 1012, 1017 n.6 (Del. 1996).
18
All of the old decisions cited by Mr. Ward, supra note 14, involve corporate
directors.
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controlling shareholders before reflecting more generally on how the rule
and fiduciary duties might be sensibly realigned in all three areas—
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
A. The Settled Business Judgment Rule for Corporate Directors
Doctrinally, the business judgment rule "is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."19 That 1984 formulation,
however, is only one of three constitutive strands of the rule, specifically,
the procedural guide.20 Another aspect stems from the 1993 effort to link
analytically the business judgment rule and fiduciary duties.21 There, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that to rebut the rule's Aronson
presumption, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead a breach of fiduciary
duty, whereupon the burden shifts to defendant directors to prove the
entire fairness of a transaction.22 This is the rule-duty linkage strand.23 If
a plaintiff fails to carry that burden, the substantive dimension of the rule
"attaches" to protect director decisions because courts will not "secondguess" business judgments.24 This last "substantive" law strand of the
rule stems, in its current formulation, from the 1971 decision in Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien.25 Thus, although well established, the contours of
the business judgment rule have been altered over the years and now
encompass refinements from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
Clearly, moreover, the decisional law focus is on directors.26
This is seen not only in existing doctrine, but also in well-known policy

19

at 812.

20

Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); Aronson, 473 A.2d

See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
21
Id. at 361-62.
22
Id. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (affirming the
procedural and the rule-duty linkage strands of the business judgment rule announced in Cede
& Co.).
23
See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 706.
24
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
25
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (director business judgment will not be overturned if
it "can be attributed to any rational purpose"). See also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985)). Prior to Sinclair, as enhanced by Aronson, Delaware courts would not interfere
with business judgments unless there was "gross and palpable overreaching," or equivalent
conduct. E.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970) (quoting Meyerson
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967)).
26
See infra Part II.D (discussing the business judgment rule and director conduct).
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rationales for the rule.27 Delaware courts frequently ground the rule in
that section of the corporate statute providing that the business and
affairs of a corporation are to be managed by or under the direction of its
board.28 This is a director-centered rationale.29 Another rationale is to
induce qualified persons to serve as directors and to more closely align
director attitudes toward risk—they will capture little of the eventual
payoff from success but face litigation exposure from failure—with
stockholder risk preferences as influenced by holding a diversified
portfolio of stock.30 A third rationale emphasizes that judges, as public
officials, unlike directors, are not business experts; and directors, not
judges, are elected by stockholders.31 These rationales coalesce to form
the rule's "powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the
directors."32
Moving beyond doctrine and policy to history, one finds that the
business judgment rule became a key feature of Delaware's jurisprudence
long before the duty of care.33 This history is well traced by Justice
Henry Ridgely Horsey in a lecture delivered at Widener University
School of Law and later published as an article in this journal.34 Justice
Horsey confessed to being surprised at finding that it was only in 1963
that the Delaware Supreme Court came to "first recognize the existence
of a director's fiduciary duty to act in an informed and prudent manner,

27

See Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty Of Finest Loyalty And
Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule In Unincorporated Business
Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 350-51 (2005) (discussing justifications for the
business judgment rule).
28
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012); see, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360;
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). See also In re
Cox Commc'ns S'holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining the business
judgment rule "exemplifies and animates" centralized management in the form of a
corporation's board of directors and the subordinate officers chosen by directors).
29
See, e.g., In re Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 614 ("It would not be much of a stretch
to say that the central idea of Delaware's approach to corporation law is the empowerment of
centralized management, in the form of boards of directors and the subordinate officers they
choose, to make disinterested business decisions.").
30
See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). Former
Chancellor William Allen describes the rule as seeking to overcome a director inclination
toward "sub-optimal risk acceptance." Id. at 1052-53.
31
See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS.
LAW. 439, 456-57 (2005) (collecting authority).
32
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
33
See Justice Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 985, 995 (1994) (explaining that the
business judgment rule has been part of corporate law for at least 150 years) (citing S. Samuel
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 (1979-1980)).
34
Id.
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i.e., with due care."35 The essence of the business judgment rule, of
course, had been around for decades before that.36
Taking the doctrines in the historic order in which they had
emerged, Justice Horsey in both his 1994 scholarly article and his
contemporaneously written 1993 judicial opinion in Cede,37 linked the
duty of care with the business judgment rule by making the former a
"component"38 or an "element"39 of the latter. In this way, reflecting
Holmes's insight that the life of the common law's development is not
always logic, but experience,40 the duty of care, for corporate directors at
least, became doctrinally embedded in the still regnant business
judgment rule only about 20 years ago.41 The business judgment rule,
first to arrive on the Delaware legal scene, remained predominant, with
the director duty of care (and the duty of loyalty) being subsumed within
it.42
B. The Unsettled Issue of the Business Judgment Rule and Corporate
Officers
Surprisingly, given Delaware's extensive corporate law
jurisprudence, it is not settled today whether in cases involving corporate
officers, judges will doctrinally deploy the business judgment rule in the
same all-encompassing manner that it has been used for corporate
directors.43 Delaware courts have stated in dicta that the rule covers
officers,44 but they have not held it to be so applicable, nor have they

35

Id. at 985 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del.
1963)). Two years before Graham, however, Chancellor Seitz had held corporate directors
liable for failing in their duty to exercise, in a case involving no business judgment, "a
reasonable discharge of their duties." Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395 (Del. Ch. 1961). The
duty of care was even more forthrightly expressed in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872-73 (Del. 1985) (distinguishing care from loyalty).
36
See supra note 14.
37
See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
38
Horsey, supra note 33, at 989, 991, 997.
39
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361, 366.
40
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (1881).
41
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61.
42
See id. at 360 (referring to the duty of loyalty and the duty of care strands of the
business judgment rule).
43
Johnson, supra note 31, at 440-41.
44
Id. at 443-47 (discussing cases). See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist
Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson,
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005) (stating that the "policy rationales underlying the development
and application of the business judgment rule" warrant its application to officers as well as
directors).
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analytically linked it to fiduciary duties as they did with respect to
directors in the Cede framework. Consequently, they also have had no
occasion to fully consider the policy case for and against application of
the rule to officers.45
In fact, in the 2009 decision of Gantler v. Stephens,46 a case of
first impression on officer duties, the Court rather obviously did not
subsume the duty of care under, or even mention, the business judgment
rule in its treatment of officers. Importantly, the Court stated that while
it had earlier "implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like
directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary
duties of officers are the same as those of directors . . . [w]e now
explicitly so hold."47 Conspicuously absent in its analysis of officer
duties, however, was the business judgment rule.48 Thus, in Gantler,
after applying the usual analytical framework of requiring plaintiffs to
overcome the presumptions of the business judgment rule for directors,49
by way of contrast, the Court straightforwardly found, with respect to
officers, that the plaintiff's allegations "state a claim that they breached
their fiduciary duties as officers."50
Although neither the doctrinal nor policy aspects of the business
judgment rule have been settled with respect to officers, on the historical
front officers strikingly differ from directors.51 Recall that for directors in
Delaware the business judgment rule emerged well before full
articulation of the duty of care.52 Consequently, perhaps out of a belief
that the newer concept should be engrafted onto the older (rather than
vice versa) director fiduciary duties became "elements" or "components"

45

For contrasting views on this issue, compare Johnson, supra note 31, at 452, 462-69
(advocating against an application of the business judgment rule to officers), with Hamermesh
& Sparks, supra note 44, at 865 (advocating for an application of the business judgment rule to
officers).
46
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
47
Id. at 708-09.
48
See id. at 708-09 (holding plaintiffs had stated claim that defendants breached their
fiduciary duties as officers without discussing the business judgment rule in reference to the
officers).
49
Id. at 708.
50
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709. See Michael Follett, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany
or Big Failure? A Look at the Current State of Officers' Fiduciary Duties and Advice for
Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 565-66, 582 (2010) (business judgment rule for
officers unresolved).
51
Follett, supra note 50, at 566-69 (discussing the different duties between officers and
directors and whether the courts should grant officers protection under the business judgment
rule).
52
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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of the business judgment rule in 1993.53 But in Gantler, the fiduciary
duties of officers emerged prior to the business judgment rule, which has
not yet been adopted for officers in Delaware.54 Therefore, with respect
to officers, in Delaware there is currently no pre-existing historical,
policy, or doctrinal connection between fiduciary duties and the business
judgment rule, as is the case with directors.55 Put another way, at least
for now, Gantler momentarily has properly placed the fiduciary duty
horse in front of the business judgment rule cart, not behind it, as in
Cede.56 The unsettled issue is whether Delaware law eventually will, for
officers, follow the approach adopted for directors and subsume duties
within the rule or, conversely, not do so and, in fact, use officers as a
timely occasion to reconsider the linkage earlier made for directors.
Before addressing that, the unsettled (and unsettling) relationship of the
business judgment rule to controlling shareholders will be treated,
because it helpfully illuminates precisely the same issue.
C. The Unsettling Issue of the Business Judgment Rule and
Controlling Shareholders
If the future application of the business judgment rule to officers
remains unsettled, the possible application of it to controlling
shareholders is unsettling. The deployment of the business judgment
rule in the shareholder setting seemed to first appear in the late 1960s.57
It was then more or less suppressed for controlling shareholders in the
1990s in favor of uniformly using an entire fairness standard where selfdealing is involved;58 now it may be on the verge of more generally reappearing, particularly in light of Chancellor Strine's recent and
important opinion in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation.59 This Article
does not dispute the various policy considerations favoring a more
deferential approach to controlling shareholder conduct under certain

53

See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. This issue is taking on renewed
importance given recent federal rulings in California that the business judgment rule does not
apply to officers. See FDIC v. Perry, 2012 WL 589569, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); FDIC
v. Hawker, 2012 WL 2068773, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2012). But see FDIC v. Briscoe, No.
1:11-cv-02303-SCJ (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2012). See generally John Jenkins, But I Just Work
Here!: The Rise of Corporate Officer Fiduciary Liability, 6 DEAL LAWYERS 1 (Nov.-Dec.
2012) (discussing scholarship and case law).
55
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56
This is elaborated on in infra Part II.D.
57
See infra Part II.C.1.
58
See infra Part II.C.2.
59
See infra Part II.C.3.
54
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conditions, but the business judgment rule is not the appropriate doctrinal
vehicle for implementing that approach. Thus, as is the case with
officers, the possible re-emergence of the rule in the controlling
shareholder context offers a timely occasion to re-consider the larger
utility of the rule in framing Delaware's fiduciary duty analysis. This
will be taken up after first tracing the rule's fleeting but possibly reemergent role in the shareholder setting.
1. The Appearance of the Business Judgment Rule
Delaware courts traditionally examined business dealings
between a controlling shareholder—frequently a parent corporation—and
the controlled company using a strict entire (or intrinsic) fairness test.60
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp. are widely cited 1952 decisions that did so, and neither mentioned
the business judgment rule.61 In 1970, however, the Delaware Supreme
Court introduced the business judgment rule into its analysis of
transactions involving controlling shareholders.62
In Getty Oil Company v. Skelly Oil Company,63 the Court recited
that the proper test for parent-subsidiary dealings was fairness,64 but
stated that there were two tests "to determine the limits of
'fairness' . . . ."65 Citing Sterling,66 the Court first referred to the "'intrinsic
fairness'" test,67 but then also referred to the "'business judgment' test,"68
the latter being applicable where the terms of a transaction are set by a
third party, not the parent.69 As support for the latter proposition, the
Court cited a 1967 Delaware Court of Chancery decision, Meyerson v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co.70 The court in Meyerson acknowledged that the
60
See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-110 (Del. 1952);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. Ch. 1952); accord David J. Greene &
Co. v. Dunhill Int'l., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968).
61
David J. Greene & Co., 249 A.2d at 430.
62
See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 886.
65
Id. at 887.
66
93 A.2d at 107.
67
267 A.2d at 887 (finding that fairness standard would be met through a transaction
reached as though each party exerted bargaining power at arm's length).
68
Id.
69
Id. (observing in the special context of that case that the third party is "usually the
State or Federal Government").
70
246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967). See also Wolfunsohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253
A.2d 72, 76 (Del. 1969) (holding that a finding of overreaching is necessary to prevail against
a parent of a subsidiary).
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proper test for parent-subsidiary dealings was fairness, but considered the
arm's length measure to be meaningless in parent-subsidiary dealings,
and thus the court observed that the question "is reduced to one of
business judgment with which the court should not interfere . . . ."71
Relying on this approach, the Getty Court also noted, however, that one
basis for interfering with business judgment is an advantage obtained by
the controlling shareholder to the disadvantage of the subsidiary or its
minority shareholders.72 The court in Getty found no advantage accruing
to the parent in relation to the subsidiary or its minority stockholders and,
therefore, held that there was no warrant for the court to interfere.73
The following year, the Delaware Supreme Court sought to
clarify the relationship between the entire fairness and business judgment
standards in the shareholder context.74 In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,75
the Court stated that the intrinsic fairness standard did not apply to all
parent-subsidiary dealings, but only those where there was "selfdealing"—i.e., where the "parent causes the subsidiary to act in such a
way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the
exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders . . . ."76
Critically, however, the Court observed that, where self-dealing is
absent, then the business judgment standard is to be applied to
transactions involving controlling shareholders;77 the Court also
reiterated the pertinence of that standard for corporate directors.78 Thus it
is that the business judgment rule standard came to be applied to
controlling shareholders. But the reason is not so much that a
compelling case for the rule was ever made, or even considered. Rather,
the rule was then seen as the only available doctrinal alternative to the
much stricter fairness standard.79
After Sinclair, absent self-dealing by a controlling shareholder,
the business judgment rule became the generally applicable or "default"
standard.80 Consequently, a rule originally designed for corporate

71

246 A.2d at 794.
267 A.2d at 887.
73
Id. at 888.
74
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-22 (Del. 1971).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 720.
77
Id.
78
Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
79
See id.
80
See generally Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review In
Conflict Transactions On Motions To Dismiss: Lessons Learned In The Past Decade, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 967, 998-1003 (2011) (illustrating through case studies that the presumption of the
business judgment rule is standard under Delaware law unless rebutted). But see Frank v.
72
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directors and rooted in policy rationales specifically tailored to the
statutory role of corporate directors in company governance took hold in
the 1970s in the controlling shareholder context.
2. The Suppression of the Business Judgment Rule
Although the business judgment rule after Sinclair became the
default standard for reviewing a transaction where a controlling
shareholder did not self-deal,81 the question arose as to whether there was
some other way to invoke that relaxed standard instead of entire fairness,
even where there was self-dealing.82 This was particularly true after two
mid-1980s Delaware Supreme Court decisions reaffirming application of
the demanding entire fairness test with a corresponding burden of proof
shift.83 After some uncertainty at the Delaware Court of Chancery level,84
the Delaware Supreme Court held in 1994 that entire fairness—not
business judgment rule review—was the only applicable standard.85 And
this was true even if the self-dealing transaction was approved by a
properly functioning committee of independent directors with real
bargaining power or was approved by a vote of a majority of the
minority shareholders.86 Either of those approval mechanisms could
effectuate a shift in the burden of proof from defendants to plaintiff, but
would not lead to business judgment rule review.87 Thus, having been
unleashed into the controlling shareholder area, application of the
business judgment rule to controlling shareholder transactions had, by
1994, become severely restricted in key settings.

Elgamal, 2012 WL 1096090, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012) (entire fairness standard where no
self-dealing by controlling shareholder but where latter derived benefit from and could veto
transaction with nonaffiliated party).
81
Frank, 2012 WL 1096090, at *7-*8. The rule also is typically applied where a noncontrolling stockholder's conduct is challenged. Id.
82
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983). See also
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (discussing the entire fairness
standard).
83
Id.
84
Compare In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1988 WL 111271, at
*884-*85 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (providing a possible application of business judgment
review), with Citron v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 499-500 (Del. Ch.
1990) (addressing the entire fairness standard).
85
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994). For a recent
reaffirmation of this approach by the Supreme Court, see Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012).
86
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117.
87
Id. at 1116. The Court in Kahn did not consider the effect of deploying both
approval mechanisms on the standard of review. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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3. The Possible Re-Emergence of the Business Judgment Rule
The possible application of the business judgment rule standard
even to self-dealing transactions by controlling shareholders has emerged
in certain Delaware Court of Chancery decisions.88 In In re Cox
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, then-Vice Chancellor
Strine addressed two policy concerns arising under the Lynch entire
fairness review standard.89 First, he noted the value of creating an
incentive for transactional planners to use the deal structure that is most
advantageous to minority shareholders.90 Second, he explained the
importance of providing defendants with a meaningful option to get rid
of nonmeritorious cases short of trial.91
The chief hindrance to both of these was the entire fairness test
which, even with a burden of proof shift resulting from independent
committee or minority shareholder approvals, made it virtually
impossible for defendants to gain a pre-trial dismissal.92 Emphasizing
that Lynch had not foreclosed use of the business judgment rule standard
where both an independent negotiating committee and approval by a
majority of minority shareholders were used,93 Strine noted that such
"double approvals" would benefit minority shareholders.94 To incentivize
their salutary use in structuring transactions ex ante, Strine suggested that
self-dealing "going private" mergers be accorded business judgment rule
review where the controlling shareholder proposed a deal subject, from
inception, to both approval mechanisms.95 Moreover, in any ensuing
litigation, defendants could then obtain a pre-trial dismissal unless
"plaintiffs pled particularized facts that the committee was not
independent, or was ineffective because of its own fiduciary duty breach
or wrongdoing by the controller (e.g., fraud on the committee)[,]" or

88

In re MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013); In re
CNX Gas Corp. S'holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc.
S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005).
89
879 A.2d at 606-07.
90
Id. This point was repeated several times by Chancellor Strine in the 2013 MFW
decision. MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *4, *20, *21.
91
Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607. The Supreme Court in Theriault held that,
prospectively, "if the record does not permit a pretrial determination that defendants are
entitled to a burden shift," the defendants will retain the burden throughout the trial. Americas
Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012).
92
Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607, 617.
93
Id. at 617.
94
Id. at 642.
95
Id. at 643-44.
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because the approval by minority shareholders was somehow tainted.96
Seeking to reconcile his doctrinal suggestion with the rules
governing so-called Siliconix tender offer freeze-outs,97 Strine proposed
extending it into that setting as well.98 This proposal was subsequently
considered at length by Vice Chancellor Laster in his 2010 decision in In
re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation.99 As Strine had five years
earlier,100 Laster cited extensive academic commentary addressing this
issue,101 and he agreed that Strine's suggestion was the "coherent and
correct approach."102 He also made the doctrinal point that using both
approval mechanisms (i.e., an effective independent committee and
minority stockholder approval) meant that, essentially, the controller
only stood on "one side of the transaction,"103 thus removing the predicate
of standing on "both sides of a transaction" that, stemming from Sterling
and Sinclair,104 underlies the demanding entire fairness standard.105
However astute the analyses of Chancellor Strine and ViceChancellor Laster, the Cox and CNX cases did not squarely present the
issue of whether using both an independent committee and a majority-ofthe minority provision would result in business judgment rule review.106
That changed in MFW, where the issue was squarely posed for the first
time to Chancellor Strine.107 In a very careful and scholarly opinion,
Chancellor Strine drew heavily on, and further elaborated on, his earlier
analysis in Cox.108 He held that when a controlling shareholder merger
has, from the outset, "been subject to (i) negotiation and approval by a
special committee of independent directors fully empowered to say no,
and (ii) approval by an uncoerced, fully informed vote of a majority of
the minority investors, the business judgment rule standard of review

96

Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 644.
See In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 437 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re
Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001), reprinted in
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1020 (2002).
98
Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607, 646.
99
4 A.3d 397, 414 (Del. Ch. 2010).
100
Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 618 n.34, 624 n.50, 625 n.52, 644 n.85.
101
CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 407 n.4, 409 n.5.
102
Id. at 414.
103
Id. at 412. This also somewhat harkens back to the Getty reference to a "third
party" presence as permitting business judgment review. See supra notes 62-73 and
accompanying text.
104
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
105
CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 410-11 n.7 (citing authority).
106
In re MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013).
107
Id. at *1.
108
Id. at *20 n.140.
97
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applies."109 Finding those conditions to have been met, Chancellor Strine
reviewed the transaction under the business judgment rule standard,
found that standard to have been met by the controlling shareholder, and
granted summary judgment to all defendants.110
Chancellor Strine's analysis did not differ for the controlling
shareholder and the directors.111 Strikingly, for purposes of this Article,
Chancellor Strine did not consider whether, given that the dual approval
mechanisms had spared all defendants a strict entire fairness review, an
alternative review standard other than "business judgment" review would
better suit a controlling shareholder whose conduct is attacked.112
Specifically, as in Gantler for officers,113 Chancellor Strine might have
straightforwardly asked, with respect to the controlling shareholder,
whether plaintiffs could proffer any evidence that the shareholder had
breached a fiduciary owed to them. Failing that, as plaintiffs did,
warranted entry of summary judgment.114 The cumbersome business
judgment rule edifice did not need to be introduced into the MFW
analysis because it not only added nothing, it is not designed for, nor are
its policy underpinnings aimed at, shareholders.
The reasoning and conclusions reached in all of these Delaware
Court of Chancery decisions are impressive and persuasive. But moving
away from entire fairness review in the going private setting (or any selfdealing context) in favor of a more deferential approach to achieve
laudable policy objectives simply does not necessarily mean a business
judgment rule framework should be adopted. Instead, in a manner
similar to the approach taken by Gantler with respect to corporate
officers,115 the Delaware Supreme Court should, notwithstanding
Chancellor Strine's use of the rule in MFW, consider this controlling

109

Id. at *4. The pertinent language derived from this case states:
The business judgment rule is only invoked if: (i) the controller
conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a special
committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the special
committee is independent; (iii) the special committee is empowered to freely
select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the special committee
meets its duty of care; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there
is no coercion of the minority.
Id. at *25.
110
MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25. The defendants were a
controlling shareholder and the directors of the to-be-merged corporation. Id. at *1.
111
Id. at *1-*2.
112
Id. at *20.
113
See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
114
See MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25.
115
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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shareholder issue as a straightforward matter of fiduciary duty. In other
words: Has the plaintiff sufficiently pled a duty of care breach
(extremely unlikely with respect to a shareholder) or a duty of loyalty
breach? The business judgment rule—designed for directors, rooted in
their plenary governance role, and central there only because of
history—should be bypassed here. To speak of "business judgment" in
the shareholder context is incoherent because such a shareholder makes
no "business" judgment on behalf of the corporation in the same statutory
way directors do. To be sure, in a third party merger, shareholder
approval is necessary to effectuate the merger, but shareholders in that
setting controlling or otherwise owe no fiduciary duties to the
corporation and other shareholders.116 Instead, they can and do vote
based on whether, to them as investors, the merger is financially
beneficial.117 When minority shareholders similarly are empowered
under a majority-of-the-minority provision in a controlling shareholder
self-dealing merger, they too lack fiduciary duties, can vote based on
self-interest, and are not required to advance the company's best interests
or those of any other person.118 And when the ostensibly controlling
shareholder in that setting votes on the merger, it does not "control" the
outcome given the dual approval mechanisms and it properly and likely
votes its own financial investor interests.
The issue of the best interests of the corporation is a matter of
concern only for directors. Moreover, there simply is no reason to
require a "rational business purpose" in reviewing the conduct of a
shareholder who does not act for the company or breach a fiduciary duty.
Chancellor Strine did so, however, because he saw the business judgment
rule construct as the only alternative to entire fairness.119 That inquiry,
however, is simply inapt for examining shareholder conduct.
In the Lynch, MFW, and Siliconix settings, the underlying
concern is whether the controlling shareholder discharges its duty of
loyalty as it seeks to gain for itself complete ownership of the stock (or
other advantage) to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.120

116

See In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1040-41 (Del. Ch. 2012).
See id. ("[T]he duty to put the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
above any interest . . . not shared by the stockholders generally does not mean that the
controller has to subrogate his own interests so that the minority stockholders can get the deal
that they want." (internal quotations omitted)).
118
See id.
119
See MFW S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *16.
120
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Del. 1994); MFW
S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25; In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., 2001 WL
716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001), reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1020-21
117
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Although taking different transactional paths, only one of which involves
classic self-dealing, both forms implicate the hallmark of loyalty—"the
need to protect minority stockholders . . . ."121 Triggered by the desire of
the controller to gain something from, or to the detriment of, the
minority, the duty of loyalty would, as a default standard, require the
controller to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.122 However, if as
Chancellor Strine proposed in Cox Communications, and squarely held in
MFW,123 the controller conditions the proposal from the outset on the dual
approval mechanisms, then ex ante the controller presumptively fulfills
its duty of loyalty subject only to ex post allegations of fiduciary
wrongdoing by the independent committee or tainted approval by the
minority shareholders, as to which the plaintiff has the burden.124 The
conduct of the committee members themselves, moreover, provided they
truly were independent and properly-functioning, would, because they
are directors, receive traditional business judgment rule review.
Maybe…
D. The Business Judgment Rule and Review of Director Conduct
Having suggested that application of the business judgment rule
standard to corporate officers and controlling shareholders is unnecessary
and unsound on doctrinal and policy grounds,125 could the same be said
with respect to application of the rule to directors themselves? The
emergent areas of officers and controlling shareholders at least offer a
lens to reconsider this issue. Such a suggestion, initially, seems
heretical, particularly given the rule's long pedigree as the presumptive
standard of judicial review.126 And the policy rationales for the rule are
sound,127 particularly the court's deference to the substance of director
decisions.128 Nonetheless, the role of the business judgment rule in
(2002).

121

In re Cox Commc'ns S'holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
123
879 A.2d at 643-44; 2013 WL 2436341 at *5.
124
Id. at 644 (if only one approval mechanism were used, the entire fairness standard
would remain applicable).
125
For officers, the doctrinal and policy rationales for applying the business judgment
rule are stronger than for controlling shareholders given officers' managerial role in corporate
governance, but use of the rule is unnecessary. For controlling shareholders, use of the rule is
unsound on doctrinal/policy grounds and the rule unnecessarily complicates what should be a
more straightforward fiduciary duty analysis.
126
Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
127
See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
128
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 45 n.17.
122
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Delaware corporate law warrants revisiting for several reasons.
First, the business judgment rule, not fiduciary duties, currently
enjoys pride of place in Delaware.129 Essentially, the business judgment
rule is a doctrinal vessel of judicial review into which the fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty are fitted and subsumed.130 As noted by the Delaware
Supreme Court, the duty of care is but an "element of the rule."131 But
fiduciary duties are broader in scope than the reach of the business
judgment rule, which applies only if an identifiable business judgment is
made.132 An example is a faulty oversight context where no business
decision was exercised.133 And fiduciary duties apply to directors
whether or not their conduct is reviewed later in court.134 Thus, the more
narrowly applicable doctrine should not sensibly serve as the umbrella
concept for the broader-reaching duties. Moreover, given the importance
of judicial formulations to lawyerly counsel and director
understandings,135 it is no answer to insist that the rule is a standard of
review only and not a standard of conduct. Presumably, many non-law
factors influence legal advice and director conduct, but when it comes to
law itself, the sole concern is likely whether, if attacked, a decision
stands up in court and liability is averted. The deployment of the
business judgment rule as the organizing framework, therefore, is
jurisprudentially flawed because it is under-inclusive. Its retention as the
keystone concept reflects a misguided effort to use it as a unifying
doctrinal artifact for both conceiving and reviewing director compliance
with fiduciary duties.
Second, the primacy of the business judgment rule over fiduciary
duties in Delaware's analysis of director performance is an accident of
history.136 The duty of care, being a doctrinal latecomer,137 was, along

129
See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(noting that under the business judgment rule, the court presumes "directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company").
130
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
131
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 (Del. 1994). See supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text.
132
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). The Delaware Supreme Court,
moreover, has described director duties as "unremitting." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 1011(Del. 1998).
133
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 & n.9 (Del. 1993).
134
See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 (noting that fiduciary duties are a "constant compass by
which all director actions . . . must be guided").
135
See id. (noting the court has tried to mark clear guidelines regarding fiduciary duties
to help directors act within them); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (stating the business judgment
rule is "both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive rule of law").
136
See supra Part II.A.
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with the duty of loyalty, embedded into the pre-existing business
judgment rule framework in Cede, in an effort to harmonize those duties
with the rule.138 But the rule has retained analytical preeminence, leading
to a diminished emphasis on what is really most critical to corporate
governance, both in and out of court: Did directors fulfill or breach
either of their fiduciary duties?139 That issue should be doctrinally
showcased, not obscured.
Third, all of the laudable policy rationales said to undergird the
rule can be preserved while placing primary emphasis on a director's
fiduciary duties. The plaintiff still must establish a breach of any
fiduciary duty.140 And in the duty of care context, the court still would
not weigh in on the substantive soundness of director decisions.141 But
that already is true in the duty of care context because care itself is
entirely process-oriented.142 There is no substance to duty of care
review.143 Consequently, there is no need to add, via the rule, either
Aronson's "presumption" strand of the rule or the Sinclair/Cede
"substantive" strand.144 Thus, it is as an aspect of duty of care review that
the true "substantive" function of the business judgment rule can be seen.
It cogently houses the sensible policy decision of courts not to secondguess business judgments as part of reviewing fiduciary duty of care
claims.145 Ironically, then, business judgment deference is better
understood as an "element" of care, not the reverse, as currently is the
case.146 In effect, the judicial policy of not substantively reviewing care
claims mirrors the opposite entire fairness approach in loyalty claims
where substance is reviewed.147 In classic director self-dealing (loyalty)
137

See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
139
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (describing the duties of loyalty and care as standards
within the business judgment rule).
140
Id. at 361.
141
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("As for the plaintiffs' contention
that the directors failed to exercise 'substantive due care,' we should note that such a concept is
foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors'
judgments.").
142
Id. ("Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.").
143
Id.
144
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. To the extent a substantive "floor"
for fiduciary behavior is thought desirable, substantively irrational behavior permits an
inference that good faith is lacking. Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del.
1999).
145
See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (highlighting the policy of the courts not to
second-guess business judgments).
146
See id. at 360 (describing the duties of loyalty and care as standards within the
business judgment rule).
147
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that in the context of
business judgments due care is not reviewed substantively); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361
138
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cases, of course, the judicial policy of no substantive review falls away
and the rule does not and should not play any role.148
Moreover, the only theoretical basis for imposing liability on a
director or for overturning a board decision is violation of some legal
precept, such as a fiduciary duty.149 It is not unlawful to make a business
judgment; it is unlawful to do so in a way that breaches a duty.150 Thus,
the focus should be on fiduciary duties, which courts are legally
competent to address, not the "business judgment" rule. The mere
phrasing of it suggests that there is some jurisprudential basis for
judicially interfering (or not) in a business decision when there is no such
basis apart from a duty breach.151 Even then, courts do not "review" or
"second-guess" the substance of business decisions; they simply proceed
with the analysis under fiduciary duty principles.152
Directors are afforded ample latitude in making business
decisions and taking appropriate risks by calibrating the duty of care at
the gross negligence level,153 essentially a permissive recklessness
standard.154 Thus, even as to process, great deference is given to
directors. Moreover, statutory exculpation remains fully available for
duty of care breaches if stockholders approve an even greater measure of
protection for directors than just a loose liability standard.155 Neither of
these benefits requires the business judgment rule. In addition, the
current pleading or review standards on a motion to dismiss need not
change. A pleading that is inadequate to make it past a dismissal motion
today under the rule's rubric will still be inadequate when the
straightforward focus is on duties.156 If a plaintiff today cannot
sufficiently plead enough to overcome the "presumption" of Aronson and
Cede, he has not adequately pled a breach of duty.157 And, as Professor
(describing the entire fairness standard of review).
148
See supra Part II.C.1, C.3.
149
See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61 (explaining that plaintiffs have the burden of
showing a breach of a fiduciary duty).
150
Id.
151
See id. at 361 (noting that the court will not second guess a business judgment
absent a showing by the plaintiff of a breach of director's fiduciary duties).
152
See id. (describing the entire fairness standard used for analysis of the disputed
transaction).
153
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
154
McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273-74 (Del. Ch. 2008).
155
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (permitting exculpation of directors for
damages resulting from duty of care breaches).
156
See, e.g., McPadden, 964 A.2d at 1274-75 (granting a motion to dismiss where
plaintiff failed to plead directors acted with "a conscious disregard for their duties").
157
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (to
overcome the presumption of validity of the business judgment rule, plaintiff must show a
breach of fiduciary duty).
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Larry Hamermesh has usefully pointed out, even with care claims, many
are derivative in nature, and thereby are subject to existing Rule 23.1
pleading requirements.158
Fourth, elevating fiduciary duties to be the primary focal point in
judicially analyzing director conduct—and officer and shareholder
conduct—streamlines that analysis and rationally aligns it with other
fiduciary approaches in law, such as those used in agency law.159 For
example, in a 2010 decision involving agency principles, Vice
Chancellor Parsons noted how a claim for fiduciary duty wrongdoing
requires proof of two elements: "that a fiduciary duty existed" and "that a
defendant breached that duty."160 That simple framework likewise could
be used for directors. Of course, directors owe unremitting duties,161 so
the focus in any particular case is, quite simply, whether they did or did
not breach a duty. In the care setting, the plaintiff must bear that
burden;162 while in the classic self-dealing loyalty context, one or more
directors will shoulder the burden.163
Fifth, prioritizing the business judgment rule rather than
fiduciary duties in judicial analysis serves to unsoundly deem directors to
be performing at a higher level than they might actually be performing,
while simultaneously insufficiently emphasizing the affirmative nature of
their duties.164 The business judgment rule, after all, presumes that
directors have acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that their actions are in the best interests of the company.165
In other words, it presupposes that directors are behaving carefully and
loyally, without expressly stating it just that way.166 Yet, by agreeing to
serve as directors, such persons take on an affirmative obligation they did
not have before assuming their position—i.e., to act with care and loyalty
in discharging their offices.167 Care and loyalty are not exercised, and the
158

See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1.
See, e.g., Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, ASDI, Inc., 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch.
2010) ("Under fundamental principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a duty of
loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing.").
160
Id. (citing Zrii, LLC v. Wellness Acq. Gp., Inc., 2009 WL 2998169, at *11 (Del Ch.
Sept. 21, 2009)).
161
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
162
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
163
See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 707 (Del. 2009) (noting that where a
majority of the remaining directors are self-interested, they must prove entire fairness).
164
See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 787, 805 (1999) (expressing concern that duty of care analysis is substantially
shrinking partially due to the business judgment rule).
165
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61.
166
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360.
167
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, § 7 cmt. k (2010) (stating that one who
159
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best interests of the company are not served, merely by the fact of
occupying the office of director or by inaction.168 In both judicial
doctrine and legal counsel given to directors, therefore, it should be
emphasized that directors, as the key governing body in a corporation,
must affirmatively fulfill their duties, not essentially get a linguistic
benefit of the doubt that they are doing all they should unless proven
otherwise.169
This obligation is masked by an approach that presumes
directors have behaved properly, rather than one underscoring that
directors must energetically endeavor to do so.170 This has nothing to do
with altering the customary burden of proof in litigation.171 It goes
instead to not unwittingly crafting a review standard that, in operation,
misleadingly suggests that directors have fulfilled their duties unless a
plaintiff can prove otherwise.172 The tree does fall in the forest whether
or not someone is there to observe it. So too, inadequate director
conduct is inadequate, even if undetected or unproven.
And in featuring fiduciary duties more prominently in their
opinions, judges should not couch those duties only in negative, liabilityavoiding ways.173 Thus, with respect to care, courts can and certainly
should state that the culpability standard is gross negligence.174 But the
duty of care is not merely a duty to avoid gross negligence,175 because
such phrasing lacks a reference point: Don't be grossly negligent with
respect to what? Rather, as Chancellor Chandler noted in the Disney
litigation,176 the "duty of due care requires that directors of a Delaware
corporation 'use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
men would use in similar circumstances.'"177 And in loyalty cases, courts
affirmatively acts in a manner creating risk of harm to others must exercise reasonable care in
performing those acts).
168
See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (N.J. 1981) ("A director
is not an ornament, but an essential component of corporate governance.").
169
Id.
170
See Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999).
171
But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[T]he burden is on the
party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.").
172
Id.
173
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("[F]ulfillment of
the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud.").
174
Id. at 873 ("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for
determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
one.").
175
Id. at 872-73. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act also provides that the duty of
care for a general partner is that of gross negligence. REV. UNIF. PART. ACT § 404 (1997).
176
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
177
Id. at 749 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del.
1963)).
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likewise should not only emphasize the importance of not being
disloyal—as, for example, by not wrongly self-dealing or appropriating
corporate opportunities.178 Here again, the affirmative aspect of loyally
advancing the best interests of the company should be routinely recited.179
Doing so would both draw on the traditional moral discourse aspect of
fiduciary duties recently emphasized by Chief Justice Steele,180 and
promote emerging evidence from behavioral psychology that ex ante
moral admonition can lead to more honest conduct.181
When a plaintiff asserts a claim, moreover, the focus should be
forthrightly on whether a cognizable breach of duty claim has been
pled,182 unfiltered by unnecessary reference to (or through) the threshold
"presumption" of the business judgment rule, which is not even a
particularly useful heuristic.183 A legal Occam's Razor should excise the
rule at this stage of fiduciary analysis,184 and functionally draw on it only
to preclude substantive second-guessing as part of the due care review.185
Finally, elevating fiduciary duties in prominence, and reducing a

178
See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2002) (providing an
example of self-dealing by directors of a corporation); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (providing an example of directors usurping a corporate opportunity).
179
See generally Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) (emphasizing affirmative aspect of loyalty);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris,
Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
629 (2010) (concluding that the basic definition of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to act in
good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation).
180
Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware's Modern Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 3, 3 (2012) (explaining that one
of the two purposes of fiduciary duties is to serve as a "moral pulse of our society as we define
and set expectations for business relationships"). See also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative
In Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847,
850-51 (2009) (elaborating on the strong moral reproof role of Delaware's opinions).
181
Dan Ariely, Why We Lie, THE WALL STREET J., May 26, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304840904577422090013997320.html.
182
Cf. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("A claim for
breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of two elements: (1) that a fiduciary duty existed and
(2) that the defendant breached that duty.").
183
See Carol Seidler, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in
Corporate Control Contests: Is It Time to Make Shareholders' Interests Paramount, 23 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 919, 923 (1990) ("Regardless of what standard applies, courts struggle in
imposing [liability] consistently due to the broad and often anomalous protection afforded by
the business judgment rule.").
184
Occam's Razor (or, the law of parsimony) is a principle whereby a simpler theory
with equivalent explanatory power is preferred over a more complex approach, in effect
"shaving
away"
what
is
unneeded.
Ockham's
razor,
Britannica.com,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last visited May 21,
2004).
185
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
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threshold emphasis on the business judgment rule as a standard of
review, would facilitate teaching law students and others the rudiments
of fiduciary duties. In a wry bit of understatement, the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance state as follows:
"Confusion with respect to the business judgment rule has been created
by the numerous varying formulations of the rule and the fact that courts
have often stated the rule incompletely or with elliptical shorthand
references."186 In an effort to alleviate confusion, the ALI, unlike
Delaware which embeds the duty of care within the business judgment
rule edifice,187 regards the rule as simply "a judicial gloss on duty of care
standards . . . ."188 Yet, confusion persists, and not just in the ranks of the
elite corporate bar.189
After all, the patrons of Delaware law are not only the
sophisticated members of the Delaware judiciary and Delaware bar.
They include numerous business lawyers across the country (and maybe
in other countries, such as Canada and England) who devote less than an
exclusive professional focus on Delaware developments.190 Importantly,
they also include thousands of law students every year who must learn
law and who someday may counsel the governing officials of Delaware
companies. Is Delaware fiduciary duty law and judicial analysis as clear
and user-friendly as it might be to these less knowledgeable patrons?
And to the extent Delaware law influences corporate law in other
jurisdictions, such as other states and countries, perhaps Delaware
exports needless complexity to lawyers and students in those places.191
As just one law professor who has grappled with teaching this
material to law students for almost thirty years, this author can say that
presenting students with a comprehensible, coherent, and cogent
understanding of fiduciary duties is made more difficult by Delaware's
current business judgment rule construct. Students—having studied the
concept of legal duty in diverse curricular offerings such as torts, trusts
and estates, agency and partnership law, and professional

186
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOV: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt.
a, at 173 (1994).
187
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993), modified 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994).
188
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 186, at cmt d., at 141.
189
See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, supra note 33, at 94 ("Subsuming the presumptions and
limitations under the term 'business judgment rule' leads to confusion because the single term
is then employed with reference to wholly different aspects of the rule's application, which are
governed by disparate legal principles.").
190
Del. St. Bar Ass'n, Membership, DSBA.ORG, http://www.dsba.org/index.php/aboutthe-dsba/membership.html (last visited on Jan. 27, 2013).
191
See Arsht, supra note 33, at 93-94.
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responsibility—understand the importance of legal duties, including the
scope of duty and situations of no-duty.192 The concepts of care and
loyalty, in all their manifestations, are therefore relatively easy to grasp,
if of somewhat surprising contours. And the longstanding policy of
judicial non-review that forms the key substantive essence of the
business judgment rule193—really, as noted, an aspect of duty of care
review—even if initially startling for many students who see legal
liability expanding elsewhere as judges scrutinize so many aspects of
modern life, can at least be appreciated and grasped, if not also
immediately agreed with.194
Analytically and doctrinally, the teaching could stop there—with
fiduciary duties and their breach—and students would have a solid and
workable understanding.195 Little but unnecessary complexity in the law
and pedagogy is added by then filtering all of the above through the
threshold of the business judgment rule construct as a standard of review,
particularly with the Cede breach of duty/burden shift feature.196
Introducing this form of the business judgment rule after addressing
fiduciary duties can lead students to think they may not truly grasp duties
after all, whereas starting with the Delaware business judgment rule
construct—before taking up duties—can hinder students from ever
clearly seeing just how vital duties really are.197 The overall result today
may be student familiarity with core concepts, but likely not a true
understanding. This, unfortunately, likely is the case with many
practicing lawyers as well.

192

See, e.g., Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, Delaware Student Curriculum,
http://law.widener.edu/Gateway/CurrentStudents/DelawareStudents/
AcademicResources/Curriculum.aspx (last visited on Jan. 27, 2013).
193
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 631
(2000) (stating that the business judgment rule reflects a policy of judicial non-review of the
substance of business decisions); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004).
194
See Arsht, supra note 33, at 94 (stating that the confusion surrounding the business
judgment rule has been compounded by "[j]udicial penchant for colorful phrases" like "gross
negligence," "gross abuse of discretion," and "palpable overreaching").
195
See Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment
Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2009) ("The duty of loyalty defines what
the directors are to seek to accomplish . . . . The duty of care defines how they are to pursue
that goal . . . . Good faith . . . describes the state of mind of a director who is acting in
accordance with her duty of loyalty.").
196
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
197
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 972 (1989) (concluding that "[t]he duty of care is not without
its problems. Nevertheless, it has served as a critical component of the corporate system in
this country.").
LAW.WIDENER.EDU,
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III. DOES (OR SHOULD) CORPORATE LAW MANDATE CORPORATE
PURPOSE?
A. Background
If there is a surfeit of law on the business judgment rule,198 there
is a paucity on corporate purpose.199 No corporate statute in the United
States, for example, requires a corporation to advance a particular
purpose, such as profit or share price maximization.200 Rather, consistent
with an expansive, enabling philosophy on company powers and
purposes, corporate statutes—including Delaware's—are wholly agnostic
on corporate purpose.201 Delaware's corporate purpose statute broadly
states that a corporation may conduct "any lawful business or
purpose[]."202
As to case law, there are only a handful of decisions in the entire
country that address purpose, and some of those do so quite obliquely in
dicta.203 The Delaware Supreme Court has held only that corporate

198

See supra Part II.
See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 n.33
(2012) (collecting the few cases).
200
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) ("Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to
maximize corporate profits."). See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH
24-32 (2012) ("The notion that corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to
maximize shareholder wealth simply isn't true.").
201
See EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 102.4 (5th ed. 2012) ("In lieu of the formerly required recitals of the corporation's
business or purposes, the statute now requires only the statement that the corporation may
engage in any lawful act or activity."). See also DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.01[3] (2012) (explaining that the Delaware corporate
purpose statute has become widely used as the "exclusive statement of purpose").
202
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) ("A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or
purposes . . . ."), and § 102(a)(3) ("It shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity."), with JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 240-48 (3d ed. 2010) (comparing
Delaware's broad corporate purpose statutes with other state statutes that allow or require a
corporate purpose that takes into account parties involved other than shareholders).
203
The iconic case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(stating in dictum and without recitation of authority that a business's primary purpose is to
maximize shareholder wealth). Dodge is a peculiar case for many reasons, not the least of
which is that minority shareholders earned over 20 times their initial investment from special
dividends alone. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and
Benefit Corps, 25 REGENT L. REV. 269, 274 n.22 (2012). See generally, David Yosifon, The
Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2013). This Author and
199
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directors do not typically have an obligation to maximize the share price
in the short term,204 even as they act to "benefit" stockholders205—or to
accede to shareholder desires on that score206—and they only have such
an obligation only in one narrow setting:207 a corporation's "end stage,"
i.e., in a corporate break-up, when they initiate an active bidding process,
or when they enter into a transaction that shifts a dispersed shareholding
base into a controller's hands, essentially a privatization.208 In each of
these settings, the aim is for most of the shareholders to exit because the
venture, for them, will be over.209 Beyond that, the Delaware Supreme
Court has mandated nothing, or even spoken.210
The Delaware Court of Chancery likewise said little until
2010,211 in a decision to which this Article will return.212 In dictum, in a
1986 case brought by creditors,213 the Delaware Court of Chancery said
that corporations should advance the long-term interests of
stockholders.214 And, correspondingly and in line with the Delaware
Supreme Court decision in Time,215 in 2011, that Court observed that
directors have no obligation to maximize the short-term share price.216
Professor Yosifon disagree on what Delaware law requires as to corporate purpose but
Professor Yosifon's article provides a full treatment. See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our
Continuing Struggle With The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34, 147-48 n.35 (2012) (collecting commentary). For other
judicial decisions discussing corporate purpose see Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879
(Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders."). But see Long v. Northwood Hills Corp.,
380 S.W.2d 451, 476-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (examining a corporation's purpose that is not to
maximize shareholder wealth).
204
See Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
205
In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that directors act to "benefit"
stockholders but the Court did not mandate maximization. N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (citing Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v.
NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
206
See Paramount Commc'n, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150.
207
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (discussing best price). See also Paramount Comnc'n, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1994) (discussing the best value).
208
See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994)
(stating when this obligation is triggered). See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (discussing
maximization).
209
See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
210
See COX & HAZEN, supra note 202, at 240-48 (comparing Delaware's vague use of
the corporate purpose statute with other states that suggest or require a more narrow corporate
purpose).
211
See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33-34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
212
See infra Part III.B (discussing the decision in eBay).
213
Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 875 (Del. Ch. 1986).
214
Id. at 879.
215
See Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
216
See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011)
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If there is so little law, one might ask where beliefs on this
foundational issue originate.217 Pretty clearly, thinking stems from
perceptions (even if faulty) about legal mandates,218 business norms and
conventions, management lore, faulty executive compensation
incentives, and through the professional training provided in business
and law schools.219 These are powerful influencers of thought and
conduct.
Underlying these formative molders of belief and action lie
theories about both individuals and institutions.220 As to individuals, a
strong political-legal emphasis on liberty, coupled with neo-classical
economic analysis,221 leads to a depiction of people as essentially selfinterested.222 Consequently, in commercial settings, whether in or outside
a firm, individuals, behaviorally, are presumed to consistently navigate
and bargain for self-advantage.223
Recently, this impoverished
anthropological view of human behavior has been challenged by
behavioralists based on empirical work,224 largely because instances of
altruistic behavior and self-denial are simply too common to ignore.225
At the organizational level of theory—whether as to a
corporation or other association—this cramped anthropology of the
individual carries over.226 The organization is frequently theorized as a
"nexus of contracts,"227 that is, as simply a web of various contracting
relationships.228 It is essentially disaggregated and disregarded as a
meaningful institution in its own right.229 Little heed is given to whether
the organization itself—be it a business firm, university, sports team,
(quoting Paramount Commc'n, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150).
217
See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism In Corporate Form: Corporate Law And Benefit
Corporations, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 273-76 (2013).
218
This certainly lies behind the post eBay enactment of legislation in several states
permitting the formation of so-called "benefit corporations," that need not maximize profits or
returns to shareholders. See id.
219
Id. at 275-76.
220
See Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 99, 103-06 (1989). See also William W. Bratton Jr., The New Economic Theory of the
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1480-82 (1989).
221
Bratton, supra note 220, at 1480.
222
See Butler, supra note 220, at 103-06. See also Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the
Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 75, 84-89 (describing self-interest premise in
corporate law and contrary evidence).
223
The seminal work is FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 23-29 (1991).
224
See STOUT, supra note 200, at 96-102. See also Johnson, supra note 217, at 273-76.
225
See STOUT, supra note 200, at 96-102.
226
See id. at 97-102
227
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223, at 12.
228
See id.
229
See Bratton, supra note 220, at 1475.
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labor union, religious organization, school, social club or other group—
might have an overarching institutional purpose or "mission" distinct
from that of its various constituencies.230 Many such contractarian
theorists, moreover, are strictly shareholder focused,231 especially those
emphasizing an agency theory approach,232 and thus "corporate" purpose
for them means maximizing shareholder wealth.233 Multi-stakeholder
conceptions of a corporation, including the Team Production theory,234
broaden
corporate
purpose
to
encompass
non-shareholder
constituencies.235 But neither shareholder primacy nor stakeholder
theorists fully account for various noncontractual interests.236 And
neither model articulates a truly "corporate" institutional objective or
purpose.237 Moreover, these alternative theoretical ways of thinking
about corporate purpose are largely unaffected by the fact that such
collectivities are legal persons utterly distinct from their diverse
constituencies.238
Beyond positive law and theory addressing corporate purpose,
the normative debate has gone on for decades and shows no signs of
abating.239 The shareholder primacy camp advocates that profit

230

This is a critical failing of both shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory
approaches to corporate purpose. See Lyman Johnson et al., Teaching The Purpose of
Business in Catholic Business Education, J. CATH. HIGHER ED. 18-24 (2012) (criticizing these
two approaches and advocating that a better individual and institutional understanding of a
corporation is gained through a "Community of Persons" Model). Professor Andrew Keay
recently has fully articulated the Entity Maximization and Sustainability Model he has been
developing in various articles. See ANDREW KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE ch. 4 (2011)
(explaining that a corporation, as an entity, has its own distinctive objective).
231
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223.
232
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-13 (1976).
Professor Jensen, nonetheless, recognizes that there continues to be a considerable difference
of opinion as to corporate purpose. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2001).
233
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 8.
234
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1999).
235
See id.
236
See KEAY, supra note 230, at 191-97 (explaining the problems with the
contractarian theory).
237
This critique is made quite penetratingly by Professor Keay. See id. at 189-97.
238
However corporations are conceived as a matter of theory, and however contentious
(and unresolved) the shareholder-stakeholder debate about corporate purpose may be, it is not
controversial that, as a positive law matter, corporations are distinct legal persons, separate
from their various constituencies. See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History
of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1140
(2012).
239
This is well captured in a number of places but KEAY, supra note 230, at 173
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maximization and shareholder wealth should be the proper and sole
corporate purpose.240 This largely builds on Adolph Berle's original
"trust" conception of managers as "trustees" for shareholder interests, in
an effort to avoid according managers uncontrollable discretion.241
Today, this is frequently couched in principal-agent terminology,242 in
which, contrary to law,243 financial theorists simplistically regard
directors and managers as "agents" of their "principals," the
This descriptive error in modeling corporate
shareholders.244
relationships haunts "corporate" theory today. It represents, moreover, a
profound failure by corporate law scholars, in the 1980s and now, who
draw on finance theory, to insist on accurately portraying the legal
dimension of institutional relationships. Even theorists who emphasize
the reality of board governance make the normative turn toward investor
interests. Thus, shareholder well-being is the normative goal in
Professor Bainbridge's well-known "director primacy" model.245
Those advancing multiple purposes or a broader corporate focus
than simply maximizing financial returns for investors, frequently stand
on a "multi-stakeholder" or "communitarian" conception of corporate
More neutrally, they may advance a pluralistic,
purpose.246
institutionalist approach in which different firms and their managers
pursue different purposes, in varying degrees combining financial
pursuits with "socially responsible" objectives.247 The antecedents for
stakeholder views are Merrick Dodd's multi-constituency conception of
director duties,248 and Berle's more societal model of the corporation249—
each extending consideration to noncontracting parties such as the
"public interest"—as well as mid-20th century managerialism.250 These
provides a full, recent summary.
240
Id. at 43-44.
241
A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
242
See STOUT, supra note 200, at 18; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 309.
243
See STOUT, supra note 200, at 27-32 (explaining that shareholder maximization is
not required by law). Directors are not, legally, agents of shareholders or of the company
itself. Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539-40 (Del. 1996).
244
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 309-10.
245
Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (2002).
246
KEAY, supra note 230, at 117-18.
247
See Johnson, supra note 217, at 290-91 (advocating a more pluralistic, less monistic
approach to corporate purpose but not a stakeholder approach).
248
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932).
249
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 312-13 (1932).
250
See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 37 (1954)
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normative stakeholder/communitarian positions, while certainly
expanding the number of interests that should be considered and/or
served by a corporation's governing officials, continually fail to articulate
a truly overarching "corporate" purpose or mission.251
As to which normative position has held sway, historically, they
tend to ebb and flow in influence.252 Growing out of the famous BerleDodd debate of the early 1930s,253 the managerialist view predominated
in mid-century as shareholder primacy receded.254 Notwithstanding iconic
assertions by economist Milton Friedman in the early 1960s and again in
1970,255 many prominent mid-century thinkers did not concur with his
profit maximization position.256 The Friedman view received an
intellectual shot in the arm from financial theorists in the 1970s,
however, with the emergence of theoretical work on the firm by financial
theorists.257 And that "nexus of contracts" theory was very quickly
imported into legal scholarship via the "law and economics" movement
in the 1980s.258 Its normative shareholder primacy position, moreover,
rapidly became predominant as well in corporate law theory.259 Today, it
permeates the teaching of corporation law at elite law schools (and
business schools).260 Yet, through all this, even during the tumultuous
1980s takeover era,261 Delaware law remained largely agnostic and
(explaining that the purpose of business must lie outside itself in society because business is an
"organ of society").
251
KEAY, supra note 230, at 171; Johnson, supra note 217, at 290-91.
252
KEAY, supra note 230, at 21.
253
Berle, supra note 241, at 1367 (arguing that the justification for Dodd's argument is
"theory, not practice"); Dodd, supra note 248, at 1147-48.
254
DRUCKER, supra note 250, at 36. Berle conceded mid-century that Dodd's view, at
that time, seemed to have prevailed. Berle, supra note 241, at 1371-72. His concession
proved to be premature.
255
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Milton Friedman, The
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32,
33.
256
Besides management guru Peter Drucker's mid-century views, see supra note 250,
at 37, even the mainstream Harvard Business Review featured a 1960 article criticizing profit
maximization. Robert Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, 38 HARV. BUS. REV.
126 (1960).
257
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 329-30.
258
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223, at 12, 90-91.
259
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).
260
In a 2011 report, the Brookings Institute documented that the top 20 law schools
and the top 20 business schools in the United States overwhelmingly teach a shareholder
primacy approach to corporate purpose. Darrell West, The Purpose of the Corporation in
Business and Law School Curricula, BROOKINGS INST. (July 2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/7/19%20corporation%20west/0
719_corporation_west.
261
Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 933 (1990) (noting that Delaware courts remained
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ambivalent about corporate purpose.262
As we currently stand in the midst of a seemingly strict
shareholder primacy theoretical era, it should be recalled that normative
positions on corporate purpose have dramatically changed, historically.
Besides changes in 20th century thinking noted above, in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries, for example, corporations generally were
chartered to fulfill some public purpose, not solely to pursue private
gain.263 Although law moved away from requiring a public purpose to
permitting private gain, it never—outside very narrow settings264—has
required the pursuit of a particular purpose. Thus, law today, by being
agnostic, rightly refrains in a free society from prematurely (if ever)
foreclosing ongoing, and sometimes shifting, social and normative
debates about the proper goal(s) of corporate activity.265 This stance
seems particularly sensible at those moments when significant segments
of American society once again appear to be somewhat disenchanted
with the corporate sector. Likely, we are now in a period in which
societal expectations of the private business sector are shifting. As such,
law rightly adopts an enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate
purpose, even as the fiduciary obligations of directors and managers can
clash with that permissiveness because of the need to hold such persons
accountable for their conduct. Often the deference of the business
judgment rule becomes a key mechanism for creating the necessary slack
between law's agnosticism about corporate purpose and actual
governance conduct.
It is against this doctrinal, theoretical, and historical backdrop
that the 2010 Delaware Court of Chancery case of eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark arises.266 For the first time, albeit in an
unusual procedural setting, a Delaware court, outside the so-called
Revlon setting,267 articulated shareholder wealth maximization as the
required objective of corporate endeavor.268 Such a novel and bold
position invites close study.

"ambivalent" about corporate purpose to reflect larger societal ambivalence).
262
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1385, 1415, 1425 (2008). The judiciary's ambivalence about corporate purpose remains
in the twenty-first century. Id. at 1426.
263
Johnson, supra note 238, at 1144-47.
264
See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
265
See supra notes 261-62 (noting societal ambivalence about corporate purpose).
266
16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
267
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986).
268
eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.
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B. The eBay Decision
1. Craigslist and Its Investors
Craigslist, Inc. was formed in the 1990s as a California
corporation that,269 in 2004, was reincorporated in Delaware.270 It had
three early shareholders—Messrs. Craig, Buckmaster, and Knowlton—
and thirty-four employees.271 Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that
Craigslist had an unusual business strategy, culture, and perspective on
what it means to run a successful business.272 This is because it mainly
operates its business as a community service.273 Nearly all classified ads
are placed without charge, and Craigslist does not sell advertising
space.274 Its only revenue is derived from fees for job postings in selected
cities and from apartment listings in New York City.275 Mr. Craig
described this as the corporate "mission," and Chandler observed that the
management team was "committed to this community service approach
to doing business."276 Thus, management's good faith is evident, as is
Craig's recognition that money is needed to advance the corporate
mission. This philosophical approach to business, it should be noted, is
similar to Mark Zuckerberg's 2012 description of Facebook's strategy, as
described by that iconic company's founder in a letter to shareholders
accompanying the filing of a registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.277 There, Mr. Zuckerberg stated that
Facebook did not "build services to make money; we make money to
build better services."278
The Craigslist strategy has been very successful. Craigslist long
has been the dominant company in the online classified ads industry.279
In 2002, however, one shareholder—Knowlton—wanted a greater
emphasis on profits and thus he started shopping his shares in an effort to
goad his two co-investors to effectuate change.280 eBay sought
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Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
271
Id. at 8-9.
272
eBay, 16 A.3d at 8.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
eBay, 16 A.3d at 8.
277
John Letzing & Shayndi Raice, U.S. News: Zuckerberg Faces Wall Street in First
Earnings Call, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, at A.2.
278
Id.
279
eBay, 16 A.3d at 8.
280
Id. at 9.
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Knowlton's shares, tentatively agreeing to pay $15 million.281 eBay's
initial hope was to acquire all of the Craigslist stock, not remain a
minority investor.282 Craig and Buckmaster made it quite clear, however,
that they would not sell to eBay.283 As part of the negotiations to
purchase Knowlton's stock, eBay negotiated with Craig and Buckmaster
as well over a variety of corporate governance issues.284 The result was
that Knowlton received $16 million from eBay for his stock and, in
essence, eBay invested another $16 million in Craigslist followed by
Craigslist paying Craig and Buckmaster $8 million each as a dividend.285
In this way, importantly, all three investors gained significant financial
benefit from their positions as shareholders and as a result of the
Knowlton transaction, eBay owned 28.4% of Craigslist stock, and Craig
and Buckmaster continued to own 42.6% and 29%, respectively.286
These three shareholders entered a Shareholders' Agreement that,
among other provisions, gave eBay the right to consent to certain
transactions and restricted the transfer of shares by all three investors.287
eBay expressly preserved a right to compete with Craigslist in the
classified ads business.288 Upon doing so, however, it would lose its
consent rights but, correspondingly, its shares became freely
transferable.289 Although eBay's long-term plan was to acquire Craigslist
outright, it went into its position as a minority shareholder in a business
having a unique strategy with its corporate eyes open.290 eBay was under
no illusion as to what Craigslist's avowed "mission" and business
strategy was.291 Moreover, it negotiated certain provisions but not
others.292 Notably, recalling here the teachings of Nixon v. Blackwell on
the ability of investors in close corporations to bargain ex ante for certain
financial benefits such as mandatory dividends, "put" or "call" options,
and so on,293 eBay did not so bargain on the core subjects of corporate
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Id. at 10.
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eBay, 16 A.3d at 10.
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Id. at 11.
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Id.
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eBay, 16 A.3d at 11-12.
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Id. at 13.
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Id. at 10.
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eBay, 16 A.3d at 32.
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See, e.g., id. at 12-13 (showing that eBay wanted an "entirely unfettered ability to
compete" with Craigslist, but agreed to certain consequences if they do, indeed, compete).
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Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378-80 (Del. 1993).
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purpose, profit-making, and purchase rights.294
Far from Craig and Buckmaster altering the Craigslist business
philosophy, they sought from eBay even greater appreciation for
Craigslist's "unique mission."295 The parties—now in a co-investor
relationship—had sharply divergent views about whether and how to
more vigorously "monetize" Craigslist.296 Relations became further
strained when eBay launched its own competitive business in 2007.297
This meant that eBay lost consent rights, but also that its stock became
freely transferrable.298 Craig and Buckmaster sought legal counsel as to
how to keep eBay from placing a director on the three-person board,
given that Craigslist had cumulative voting, and also on how to limit
eBay's ability to purchase additional Craigslist shares.299
Critical for this Article's purposes was the eventual adoption of a
Rights Plan ("poison pill"), an oddity for a close corporation. The aim of
the Craigslist Plan was to prevent eBay from selling its shares as a block
and from buying additional shares, particularly after Craig and
In 2008, eBay sued Craigslist, Craig and
Buckmaster died.300
Buckmaster, alleging that, by adopting the Rights Plan (and other
measures not pertinent here), the latter gentlemen breached their
fiduciary duties as both directors and controlling shareholders of
Craigslist.301
2. The Court's Analysis
Characterizing the Rights Plan as a defensive measure, the
Chancellor applied the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard.302 This
played a decisive role in the Chancellor's decision to nullify the Rights
Plan because unlike Delaware law generally—which is agnostic on
corporate purpose—Unocal, according to Chandler and a 2007 Delaware
Court of Chancery decision he cited, requires that directors "'identify the
proper corporate objectives served by their actions . . . .'"303 In fact,
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Unocal requires directors to identify a threat to "corporate policy and
effectiveness . . . ."304 This linguistic modification, and invocation of the
phrase "proper corporate objective" (or "proper corporate purpose"), was
central to Chandler's analysis because it seemingly presented for
resolution the issue of what is a "proper" corporate purpose or
objective.305 After invoking Unocal, Chandler immediately focused on
"stockholder value" to define what he believed "corporate objective"
meant.306 This is because Unocal arose in, and was designed for, hostile
takeovers, where stockholders typically are, or conceivably might be,
presented with an offer to purchase their stock. That setting, however,
was not pertinent in Craigslist because the company's Plan did not
preclude any existent or imminent purchase offer to investors.307 But it
influenced the analysis, as did the opinion's under-appreciation of
Unocal's distinction between "corporate enterprise" and "stockholders."308
It was a threat to the former that Unocal focused on, even if the threat
came from an existing stockholder.309 By Chandler's own admission,
eBay wanted to alter Craigslist's (very effective) corporate policy.310
The defendant directors understandably presented as the
identified threat under Unocal, the possible alteration of Craigslist's core
values, culture, business model, and public-service mission.311 Chandler
pooh-poohed this as a trial tactic: a "fiction," designed to invoke the
memorable reference to "corporate culture" in Paramount
Communication, Inc. v. Time.312 But that characterization is passing
strange given his own statement of facts where he clearly credits

(Del. Ch. 2007)).
304
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
305
Occasionally, Chandler would use the Unocal "corporate policy and effectiveness"
language. eBay, 16 A.3d at 31-32.
306
Id. at 33-34.
307
In this way, Craigslist was somewhat more like Moran v. Household International,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (approving adoption of Rights Plan and leaving until later its
deployment).
308
For the analysis of Craigslist's Rights Plan under the Unocal standard, see eBay, 16
A.3d at 31-33.
309
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
310
eBay, 16 A.3d at 32. Chandler also seemed overly quick to dismiss the 1960
Chancery Court decision in Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960). eBay, 16 A.3d at 32
n.102. That Unocal altered the analytical framework for defensive measures does not mean it
overturned the gist of those decisions acknowledging pre-existing corporate policies as worthy
of protection. Moreover, Chancellor Chandler did not reference Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548 (Del. Ch. 1964), which identified a proposed change in corporate sales policies as a valid
corporate interest, an obviously pertinent authority for the craigslist policy.
311
eBay, 16 A.3d at 32.
312
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at
*4 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)).

2013]

UNSETTLEDNESS IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW

443

Craigslist's "different" strategy, culture, and perspective on business.313 as
well as his acknowledgment that the strategy "continues to be
successful."314 Moreover, eBay obviously recognized the uniqueness of
the Craigslist policy because it was precisely that business strategy that
presented such a large potential monetization opportunity.315
Again switching from a focus on "corporate culture" to
stockholders, Chandler stated that defendants had not shown that
Craigslist "sufficiently promotes stockholder value . . . ."316 But
Knowlton, an early shareholder, had recently departed with a cool $16
million in an arm's length stock sale, and Craig and Buckmaster
collectively received $16 million in dividends as part of that same
transaction.317 Craigslist, thus, was not failing to provide significant
financial returns to its investors. The Chancellor then disparaged the
public service mission as a "sales tactic" designed to build a vast
community of users so that Craigslist could charge fees to select
employers and real estate brokers seeking a "large market of
consumers . . . ."318 Business strategy, however, is for corporate directors
to craft, not judges. Moreover, the complete reverse of what Chandler
conjectured could equally be true. Craigslist, like Facebook, might seek
profits—clearly redounding to investor benefit—so that it can advance
its larger, public-service corporate mission.
Having equated "corporate purpose" with "stockholder value,"
Chandler sought to add one further twist given that, factually, investors
already had made significant sums from their holdings in Craigslist and
thus its activities were not "purely philanthropic."319 He stated several
times that a corporate policy is improper if it does not seek to
"maximize" economic value for stockholders.320 Chandler acknowledged
that Craig and Buckmaster had proven that they sincerely believed
Craigslist's mission should not be about stockholder wealth
maximization.321 Yet this determination of corporate objective by the
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properly-constituted board of directors—who held, as stockholders, 72%
of the stock—was considered by the Chancellor to be of no legal moment
for Delaware law.322 It was not for them to decide, he effectively ruled,
what purpose a corporation they founded and controlled should advance
or even whether, as holders of 72% of the stock, they knew what was in
their best interests.323 Rather, he said, it was up to him, and he could not
accept such a strategy as valid.324 Seeking some legal foundation for his
view, he could only come up with the fact that Craigslist was a "forprofit" corporation.325 But he did not go on to explain how being a "forprofit" corporation meant a company had to "maximize" profits, as
opposed to making (or seeking or enhancing) profits326—as Craigslist
undoubtedly did—while also serving other chosen corporate objectives.
More importantly, whatever one's normative beliefs, or even prevailing
non-law business norms, the question remains whether positive law does
or should mandate a monistic rather than pluralistic approach to
corporate purpose.
3. The Aftermath of eBay
The eBay opinion carries important implications for corporate
theory and legislative reform as well as future doctrinal analysis by
courts. At the theory level, the opinion strongly manifests Berle's "trust"
conception of the director-stockholder relationship as well as the current
"principal-agent" conception of agency theory.327 In each of these views,
the corporate enterprise is effectively disregarded in favor of focusing on
the director-stockholder nexus. Thus, notwithstanding that corporations
are distinct legal persons,328 nor that eBay was not an end-of-theenterprise case like Revlon,329 ultimately, the Craigslist "corporate"
mission did not matter to the Court, only stockholders did. Lost then was
any respect for the corporation as an institution serving interests that
included—but more importantly, transcended—providing returns to
investors. In this way, although Delaware doctrine pays homage to an
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entity conception of the corporation in some settings,330 when corporate
purpose was on the line as in eBay, the entity conception gave way.
Doctrinally, this reflects a recurrent flaw of both the shareholder primacy
and stakeholder theories of the "corporation"—neither, in fact, pays real
heed to the corporation itself as a meaningful social-legal institution.331
Both shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories, moreover,
like the eBay opinion, are grounded in an anthropology of humans that
remains individualistic and self-interested. Stakeholder theory may
broaden the range of persons to be considered by corporate decision
makers as claimants, but it does not advance a fundamentally different
vision of human role and motivation within an institutional setting—i.e.,
that the participants' purpose, once in the firm, is to advance the larger,
common good of the company's mission. Nor, at the organizational
level, does stakeholder theory articulate an overarching "corporate"
purpose or mission. Rather, in both shareholder primacy and stakeholder
theories, the "corporation" is simply an analytical and semantic trope
representing either shareholder interests, on the one hand, or those of
multi-stakeholders, on the other. Firm relationships in both theories
remain bargained-for economic exchanges, not what Lynne Dallas calls
"covenantal relationships" based on mutual commitment to the welfare of
others and allegiance to a set of shared values and goals, as expressed in
a truly "corporate" mission and purpose.332 Put another way, pursuit of an
all-embracing corporate "common good" is ignored at both the
organizational and individual level of theory. This is odd, and a loss,
given the very etymology of "company" as meaning "breaking bread"
together,333 and of "corporation" meaning "body,"334 of which many parts
are integral. Apparently, under eBay's cramped view of corporate
purpose—as in corporate theory generally—it is legally and conceptually
incoherent to speak of Penn State, the New York Yankees, Craigslist, or
any other of countless groups, as having interests that transcend those of
particular constituencies. Profound failures of modern corporate theory

330
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 276 (1992).
331
See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
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Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 356 (2012).
333
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EUROPE, 1200-1550, at 13 (1990) ("[T]he daily dietary question was what to have with bread,
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thus meant the Chancellor had little scholarly support in striking a blow
for the validity of a genuinely corporate purpose.
As to Craigslist's pursuit of its avowed corporate purpose, the
court's remedy of nullifying the Rights Plan under Unocal did nothing to
change Craigslist's corporate mission. eBay follows the iconic Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.335 in this regard, where, after a judicial scolding,
dividends were ordered to be paid but Henry Ford still went his merry
way hiring workers and pricing vehicles just as he pleased.336 The
corporate purpose chosen by the properly-constituted governing officials
was judicially rebuked in both cases, but not judicially altered.337 This is
because judges do not and cannot make directors and officers maximize
anything in the operation of a business venture. They can only prohibit
them from taking particular actions.338 Notwithstanding this constraint on
judicial reach, the quite troubling question still arises as to whether it is
at all appropriate for a judge, who is a government official, to command
management of a private enterprise to advance (or refrain from)
otherwise lawful activities. This is particularly true where a savvy
shareholder went in with its financial eyes wide open.339 In effect, eBay
the crafty investor was fortuitously saved by a modern rendition of the
slumbering ultra vires doctrine.340
The issue of corporate purpose, moreover, can potentially raise a
troubling religious liberty concern, if not a First Amendment free
exercise issue.341 This can be seen by looking at the privately held (like
Craigslist) Chick-fil-A company, a business recently in the news for the
views of its controlling shareholder-manager on gay marriage.342 That
company famously is not open for business on Sundays.343 The reason is
the founding family's religious belief that one should rest and not
unnecessarily labor on Sundays.344 Moreover, Chick-fil-A headquarters
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displays a plaque that clearly states the religious dimension of its
corporate purpose: to "glorify God by being a faithful steward . . . [and]
have a positive influence on all . . . ."345 In addition, the company and its
founder have given magnanimously to financially assist numerous
disadvantaged groups and individuals.346 Thus, the company over the
decades has pretty clearly failed to "maximize" profits or shareholder
wealth, potentially having left hundreds of millions of dollars unearned
by its decision to close all 1,600 stores on Sunday and to generously
donate company funds.
At the urging of a hypothetical eBay-like future investor in
Chick-fil-A, would—could—the Delaware Court of Chancery rule that
that company wrongly refused to maximize profits and, therefore, should
be ordered to sell chicken on Sundays? Alternatively, what if the
founders of Craigslist had founded that company and operated it as they
do out of deeply-held religious convictions; could a Court then mandate
a change in operations so as to achieve profit maximization? To the
extent that numerous companies are operated in a profit-seeking, but not
profit-maximizing, manner out of religious belief, it would seem
disturbing on religious liberty grounds for a state official to mandate that
the governing constituents of a business must strive to make more
money.347 This raises in a particularly troubling way the more general
issue of why corporate officials of any philosophical bent should be
heavy-handedly required by law to endeavor to earn as much money as

345
See Chick-fil-A at Independence Center Timeline Photos, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151480736938318&set=pb.55766183317.2207520000.1373591949.&type=3&theater (search "Click-fil-A at Independence Center";
then click on "Photos" hyperlink; and scroll to find "Corporate Purpose" plaque).
346
See Clare O'Connor, Meet the Cathys: Your Guide to the Billionaires Behind Chickfil-A, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2012/08/03/meet-thecathys-your-guide-to-the-billionaires-behind-chick-fil-a/ ("WinShape [Foundation] is the
vehicle through which Chick-fil-A, and by extension the Cathys, have made about $5 million
of donations . . . with $1.9 million of that donated in 2010 to outfits including the Family
Research Council and Marriage & Family Foundation."). See also Partnerships and
Programs, CHICK-FIL-A FOUNDATION, http://www.chick-fil-afoundation.org/how-wehelp/partnerships-programs (last visited June 20, 2013) (donating to various disadvantaged
groups and individuals through the American Red Cross and The Salvation Army, among
others).
347
The Author is not suggesting that such a mandate would violate the First
Amendment, given the neutrality of application to all corporations, but only that religious
liberty would thereby be substantially curbed in the corporate setting. Compare HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711-12 (2012) (First
Amendment protects group communication of religious beliefs) (Alito, J., concurring), with
Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding a law
affecting religious activity when that law was equally applicable to all citizens).
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possible, provided prospective investors are fully informed in advance of
any investment, as eBay clearly was. Lawmakers should not impose
their own beliefs about the proper goals of business activity on the
private sector but should themselves remain, ironically enough,
"agnostic."
The modern corporate form after eBay may seem to offer less
flexibility than the modern LLC form when it comes to business purpose.
Delaware's LLC statute explicitly permits that type of entity to be used
by both for-profit and not-for-profit purposes,348 as noted by certain
commentators.349 By way of contrast, corporations, although they can
conduct "any lawful business or purposes,"350 are, formally, one of only
two types of corporations—i.e., for-profit or nonprofit351—unlike LLCs,
where either for-profit or nonprofit ventures can be conducted in the
same type of vehicle.352 The error and teaching of eBay, however, is to
hold that to operate at all in the for-profit mode means that profits must
be maximized rather than pursued (or enhanced, satisfied, and so on) in
some manner and to some degree. The for-profit corporation statute
itself, however, includes no such requirement.353 Thus, in the LLC
setting, there likewise can be no assurance after eBay that for-profit
LLCs may refrain from maximizing profits, if they elect to pursue profits
at all.
One legislative response to eBay in numerous states already is
the adoption of legislation authorizing the formation of benefit
corporations.354 These so-called "B Corps" are for-profit companies that
seek to make profits while also serving environmental/social
objectives.355 They do not need to maximize profits.356 Proponents of this
legislation routinely read the eBay decision as requiring profit
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2012).
See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability
Company for Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 722, 780-81 (2012)
[hereinafter Global Use of the Delaware LLC]. See also Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias,
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See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2012).
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maximization357 and, thus, that decision comprises a key reason for
promulgating a new "dual mission" form of business vehicle.
Another legislative approach to accommodate mixed purpose
business vehicles can be seen in Oregon's corporate statute.358 Oregon
permits a corporation's articles of incorporation to include a provision
authorizing or directing the conduct of the business in an
Prospective
environmentally and socially responsible manner.359
investors thus know from the outset that such a corporation may not be
maximizing profits in all circumstances and they can invest or refrain
accordingly. In this way, as with benefit corporation legislation, states
are permitting, but not mandating, a pluralistic approach to corporate
purpose rather than decreeing a singular objective. Market and social
forces, not law, can then work to determine which models succeed.360
Another statutory approach for Delaware in the aftermath of
eBay, besides its new benefit corporation statute, would be to more
clearly adopt a statutory default rule on the profit-seeking/profitmaximizing issue within its business corporation statute.361 The most
likely rule, given widespread corporate norms and conventions,362 would
be profit maximization (or, perhaps profit "enhancement"). This should
be coupled with a permitted opt-out of profit maximization (or
enhancement) in favor of an alternative and clearly specified purpose or
combination of purposes.363 In this way, the notion of the corporation as
a meaningful social-economic institution serving its own overarching
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mission distinct from that of any of its constituencies—investors or
otherwise—could be restored and brought into legal reality. And as
currently is the case in Canada, the director duty of loyalty to advance
the corporate purpose would be owed to the corporation itself, not to the
stockholders.364 Furthermore, this reform would advance the laudable
goal of facilitating greater institutional pluralism in the corporate
realm,365 thereby avoiding the overly sharp current dichotomy (and
typology) between for-profit and nonprofit corporations. As recently
observed by the Delaware Supreme Court: "[I]t is hardly absurd for the
General Assembly to design a system promoting maximum business
entity diversity."366
IV. CONCLUSION
Delaware corporate law is unsettled on two rather basic issues
addressed in this Article, i.e., the precise reach but also the continuing
utility of the business judgment rule as now formulated, and whether a
narrow corporate purpose is and should be mandated. Unsettledness, to
varying degrees, is an inherent feature of dynamic lawmaking in the
common law system. Delaware law, after all, does not design rules for a
business system that itself is static; consequently, law itself cannot be
static, and lawmaking mechanisms must themselves be highly adaptive.
We saw this very clearly in a highly compressed time period in 2012
when doubt was raised as to the existence of default fiduciary duties in
LLCs, a doubt quickly dispelled by the General Assembly.367
But doctrinal flux can also operate in a narrow band and over a
longer, Kondratiev-like cycle.368 We see this where baseline issues
remain contested and where thoughtful judges, lawyers, and professors
retain a lingering discomfort as to rule optimality and social congruence.
This Article suggests that while the policy underpinnings of the business
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judgment rule remain sound, Delaware's deployment of the rule is not.
Delaware's rule has outworn its usefulness for analyzing director conduct
for the simple if startling reason that it is doctrinal surplusage; and for
controlling shareholders, the rule is simply inapt and does nothing but
complicate the analysis. The key question for all corporate fiduciaries,
like all other fiduciaries, is whether they did or did not breach their duties
in a way that caused harm. Delaware's rule is a prolix, doctrinal vestige
wrongly pressed into service as a unifying vehicle for analyzing this
straightforward issue. Such over-refined complexity in intellectual
thought typically precedes a much-needed, simplifying paradigm shift.369
Delaware judges should fundamentally alter the "map" of fiduciary
analysis by showcasing fiduciary duties and downplaying the business
judgment rule. They can begin doing so by not adopting the rule in
analyzing officer and shareholder conduct. And for directors, the policy
of no-substantive review central to duty of care analysis can easily
accomplish the goal of deferential review in a more streamlined doctrinal
manner.
As to corporate purpose, in a complex modern economy
committed to free choice, ingenuity, experimentation, and diverse social
patterns, Delaware law should not mandate a narrow money-maximizing
purpose. As in the tumultuous 1980s, when Delaware judges wisely
refused to endorse a view that corporations existed solely to enrich
shareholders,370 common law judges should not dictate that objective
today. Such a view, although dominant in corporate law theory, is at
odds with broader social expectations of business conduct in the modern
world and it undermines much-needed judicial legitimacy in the business
law area. Delaware law should retain its enabling quality and remain
agnostic on this issue.
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